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 3 
Abstract 4 The growing popularity of private land conservation (PLC) globally has quickly 5 translated into an array of polices and programs aimed at achieving ecological benefits. 6 The rise of PLC is entwined with the era of prominence for neoliberal governance, with 7 private land proving congruous with the promotion of market-based instruments 8 (MBIs) and the increasing reliance on private protected areas for conservation in lieu of 9 government investment in public lands. Despite a growing literature on the implications 10 of neoliberal environmental governance, there remains a need for specific insights into 11 the way that individual landholders and ecologies can co-opt or resist the rationalities 12 of MBIs in the practice of private land conservation. Through semi-structured 13 interviews and property walks with 18 landholders, this research examines the 14 implementation of a reverse-auction tender scheme called ‘EcoTender’ in Victoria, 15 Australia. We uncovered four main tensions between the market logic of the program 16 and conservation practice: 1) some landholders used the payment scheme to increase 17 regulatory protections on their property through covenants/easements; 2) many 18 landholders struggled to conceive of their stewardship practice as contractual labour; 3) 19 landholders were producing novel ecosystems that challenged land management 20 focused at the property parcel scale, but EcoTender encouraged a return to historical 21 benchmark ecologies, and; 4) landholders wanted social collaboration when the 22 program required competition for cost efficiency. Our insights show that PLC must 23 create room for a diverse trajectory of conservation practice in dynamic socio-ecological 24 contexts. This means careful reflection on the validity of assumptions underpinning 25 MBIs, the trade-offs that come with applying market logic to conservation and the long-26 term implications of these instruments for policy and practice. 27  28 
Key words: market-based instruments; reverse auction; environmental governance; 29 qualitative; novel ecosystems; payments for ecosystem services 30  31  32  33  34 
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Introduction 35 Private land conservation (PLC) is generating significant interest and investment from 36 governments, NGOs and communities around the globe (Clements, Cumming, and 37 Kerley 2016). While the opportunities that PLC presents for complementing public 38 protected areas continue to be championed in the field, recent scholarship has turned a 39 critical eye to the environmental governance contexts in which PLC sits, and the 40 implications of these governance arrangements for the way that conservation plays out 41 in practice (Selinske et al. 2016; Lockie 2013; Logan and Wekerle 2008). The 42 implications of neoliberal policy instruments for PLC has been central to this analysis, 43 with questions centred around the transparency, equity and effectiveness of public 44 expenditure for private conservation, especially in the form of conservation 45 easements/covenants (Rissman et al. 2017; Morris 2008). The recent rise of market-46 based instruments (MBIs) as a conservation tool presents an important yet under-47 examined context in which to extend this analysis to policy mechanisms as they play out 48 in practice (Selinske et al. 2016).   49  50 Unpacking the systematic assumptions of neoliberal governance critiques has shown 51 that governance mentalities are rarely all encompassing when it comes to the creation 52 of neoliberal policy subjects (Van Hecken, Bastiaensen, and Windey 2015). As Stuart, 53 Benveniste, and Harris (2014) note, we need detailed case studies to examine how these 54 approaches “succeed or fail when they move from ideas into practice” (p35). Existing 55 research into the practice of MBIs has centred largely on payments of ecosystem 56 services (PES) in the Majority World (McElwee et al. 2014; Pattanayak, Wunder, and 57 Ferraro 2010; Sattler and Matzdorf 2013), and the capacity of PES to affect ongoing land 58 use change (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen 2010). We build on this work by examining 59 how MBIs that use a reverse auction tender model for private land conservation in a 60 western capitalist context are materialising in practice, with a specific focus on how 61 individual landholders as policy subjects are co-opting or resisting the logic of MBIs 62 (Higgins et al. 2014; Roth and Dressler 2012; Van Hecken, Bastiaensen, and Windey 63 2015; McElwee et al. 2014). Given rapid environmental change processes that are 64 challenging traditional approaches to conservation, we also explore how ecologies might 65 resist the logic of MBIs. Empirical analysis of neoliberal environmental governance in 66 action is critical if we are to properly assess the diverse forms neoliberalism can take, 67 
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and how the outcomes it generates can depart from policy intentions (Engel, Pagiola, 68 and Wunder 2008). 69  70 This paper centres on a reverse-auction MBI called ‘EcoTender’ in Victoria, Australia. 71 Through interviews, property walks and a participant forum with landholders, we 72 examine the types of conservation actions that have emerged through landholder 73 participation in EcoTender. We explore the tensions between the reverse auction tender 74 model and landholder aspirations for permanent protection, how landholders approach 75 the costing of their own labour as part of the bidding process, the ways that ecologies 76 can resist program prescriptions framed around private property parcels and the desire 77 for social interaction amongst participants in a program that requires competition 78 between participants to drive down costs. We conclude by discussing the role for MBIs 79 amidst local socio-ecological contexts and environmental change.  80  81 
1. The governance context of MBIs for PLC 82 Neoliberal governance has traditionally been defined by increased marketisation, 83 privatisation, and deregulation, in which state intervention is reduced (Mansfield 2009). 84 However, more recent incarnations have seen state agencies take an active role in 85 regulating through market processes, with the aim of increasing cost efficiency. This has 86 been referred too by (Tickell and Peck 2002, p. 384) as “roll-out” neoliberalism, which 87 denotes a shift in concern from deconstructing and denouncing “Keynesian-welfarist 88 and social-collectivist institutions” and is “focused on the purposeful construction and 89 consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory 90 relations” (ibid p. 384). Unsurprisingly, this complex process of both de-regulation and 91 
re-regulation has characterised recent approaches to environmental governance (Lockie 92 and Higgins 2007; Stuart, Benveniste, and Harris 2014).  93  94 The neoliberalisation of environmental governance in particular consists of the 95 promotion of market based programs and activities, the commodification and 96 marketisation of the natural environment, and the increase in privately owned 97 conservation sites, all of which result in decentralisation of conservation programs and 98 control (Fletcher and Breitling 2012). The underlying assumption here is that market 99 logic provides the most effective and efficient way to govern, as it promotes 100 “competition, creativity and innovation" (Lockie 2013, p. 31; Fletcher and Büscher 101 
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2017). This means approaches to environmental governance are touted as 102 simultaneously strengthening economic and ecological sustainability, and increasing 103 both policy efficiency and flexibility (Fletcher et al. 2016). For private land conservation, 104 the discourses of efficiency and flexibility have helped to legitimise market-based 105 mechanisms (Cooke and Moon 2015). 106      107 
1.1. Hybrid governance in practice 108 Efforts to generate social and ecological benefits through neoliberal policy have 109 underscored the competing logics that can ben inherent in this form of governance 110 (Owley and Rissman 2016; Roth and Dressler 2012; Wynne-Jones 2012). MBIs can 111 contribute to nature commodification, while at the same time promoting social learning, 112 community empowerment and the protection of threatened species (Higgins, Dibden, 113 and Cocklin 2012; Zammit 2013). Recognising these competing logics creates room for 114 diverse outcomes and dismisses any notion of neoliberalism as a project that generates 115 homogenous results (Fletcher and Breitling 2012; Roth and Dressler 2012; McElwee 116 2012). This combination of socio-environmental values within economically rationalist 117 programs has been described as form of ‘hybrid’ governance (Lockie and Higgins 2007; 118 Muradian and Rival 2012; Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Igoe and Brockington 2007). 119 However, we are of the view that the embedded market rationalities in MBIs as a policy 120 instrument makes them fundamentally neoliberal in conception. As Fletcher and 121 Büscher (2017) note, it is the conceit that market logics are both the cause of and 122 solution to environmental problems that make MBIs inherently neoliberal.  123  124 Hybrid governance reflects that “purely market-, state-, or civil society-based 125 governance strategies depend for their efficacy on support from other domains of social 126 interactions” (Lemos and Agrawal 2006. p. 298). While much of the work on neoliberal 127 conservation has centred on structural critiques (Schwartz 2013), a growing body of 128 research has begun to unpack hybrid governance by showing the divergence that can 129 occur between the intentions of neoliberal conservation and the on-ground outcomes 130 (McElwee et al. 2014; Vatn 2015; Van Hecken, Bastiaensen, and Windey 2015; Roth and 131 Dressler 2012). Yet, in the context of western capitalist systems of governance, the 132 analysis of MBIs for PLC in practice remains a largely understudied component of 133 neoliberal conservation policy (Holmes 2015; Higgins, Dibden, and Cocklin 2012). We 134 are specifically interested in understanding how and why individual landholders and 135 
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ecologies can co-opt, resist or re-appropriate MBIs to generate unanticipated 136 conservation outcomes. Unpacking the way that ecologies conform or resist enrolment 137 as a policy subject is particularly important given growing attention to nonhuman 138 agency in conservation and the capacity for conservation policy to respond to 139 environmental change in the Anthropocene (Head et al. 2015). As we will explore, MBIs 140 can carry embedded assumptions about how different species might flourish and spread 141 (or not) which can be heavily contingent on socio-ecological context.  142  143 
1.2. EcoTender – a reverse auction tender scheme for private land conservation 144 To explore MBI implementation we focus on landholder participation in a reverse-145 auction tender scheme called ‘EcoTender’, operated by the state government of Victoria, 146 Australia. EcoTender, along with its partner scheme ‘BushTender’, were active between 147 2001 and 2016, and represent some of the earliest trials of reverse auction MBIs for 148 conservation (Whitten et al. 2013; Zammit 2013). Both schemes were part of a broader 149 ‘EcoMarkets’ initiative that aimed to provide incentives to private landholders to 150 manage land for conservation through the use market mechanisms (Stoneham et al. 151 2003; Blackmore and Doole 2013; Whitten et al. 2012). Both EcoTender and 152 BushTender operated the same way, with the Victorian government serving as the 153 buyer of environmental goods “on behalf of the public” (DEWLP, 2017). EcoTender saw 154 landholders in a specified region competing for a finite pool of government funds 155 through a blind auction. Landholders were invited to submit bids for the cost of 156 conservation work they sought to undertake on their property. Like all reverse auctions, 157 the process was designed to increase cost efficiency by creating competition for funds 158 between landholders (Stoneham et al. 2003). Bids that represented the best value for 159 money in terms of the conservation benefits generated (according to an Environmental 160 Benefits Index developed by the government) would then be funded (Hajkowicz 2009). 161 With the conclusion of the EcoTender contracts that are the focus of this research, there 162 are no expressions of interest for new tenders currently open – conservation tenders 163 are now primarily operated by catchment/watershed management agencies in Victoria.  164  165 Reverse auction tenders like EcoTender are considered an example of a payment 166 approach to MBIs for conservation (Pirard 2012; Cooke and Moon 2015). The existence 167 of competition between landholders for funds, the way landholder costs and ecological 168 benefits are revealed through the bidding process, and the framing of the state as a 169 
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buyer of conservation benefits are the primary MBI characteristics of EcoTender (Pirard 170 2012; Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008; Wunder 2015). These characteristics, in 171 combination with the emphasis and reliance on private land rights for program 172 delivery, reveal an assumption that market logics offer the solution to managing the 173 problems of environmental degradation (Fletcher and Büscher 2017). It is the 174 facilitation of “market-oriented arrangements” (Pellizzoni 2011, p796) by the state as a 175 means for addressing environmental issues that reveals the neoliberal rationality of 176 EcoTender. 177  178 The conservation actions sought by EcoTender focused on ecological restoration to pre-179 colonial benchmarks, the eradication of invasive weeds and the management and 180 protection of existing patches of native vegetation (including fencing these patches). To 181 date there has been widespread adoption of tender schemes in Australia and growing 182 interest and implementation globally (Whitten et al. 2013; Zammit 2013), hence the 183 importance of exploring the nuances of how they work in practice for both the subjects 184 of those policies and the ecologies of which they are a part. 185  186 
2. Methodology 187 
2.1 Qualitative case study research design 188 This research involved a qualitative case study design that enabled an engagement with 189 participants in the context of their surrounding environment. The aim here was to 190 situate the research encounter within the EcoTender management sites, aligning the 191 methodology with the research aim of exploring on-ground practices. The research 192 design sought to understand the situated experiences, perspectives and practices of 193 landholders. At the time the research was conducted, all landholders had recently 194 concluded (within the last six months) or were soon to conclude (in the next six 195 months) their five-year EcoTender contract. Interviewing this cohort was a deliberate 196 intention of the research, as being near the end of their contract enabled reflection on a 197 longer participation timeframe in EcoTender. In order to reach a cohort near 198 completion, the research focused on the West Gippsland area, where a conservation 199 tender program had been rolled out in 2011 (Figure 1). All participants were recruited 200 through the Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning (DELWP) who 201 convened the program via an email to all participants in the West Gippsland region. 202 
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 203 
Figure 1. Map of the Gippsland study area to the east of Melbourne in Victoria, Australia. 204  205 The two research methods directed by this research design were semi-structured 206 interviews and participant observation. The semi-structured interviews encouraged 207 participants to talk through their land management practices both prior to EcoTender 208 and during their EcoTender contract, followed by discussion of the land management 209 priorities they gained through the conclusion, or impending conclusion, of their 210 contracts. The interview questions also enabled room for landholders to tell stories 211 about their experiences with EcoTender, with the aim of capturing specific events or 212 activities of importance to landholders. Participants were prompted for specific stories 213 relating to both the way their EcoTender-funded work had progressed over the course 214 of their participation, and the experience of costing a tender bid.  215   216 Following the interview, the first author walked participants’ properties with them to 217 explore how management practices had played out through EcoTender. The participant 218 observation was vital as it explicitly acknowledges that the physical environments that 219 are of importance to people’s lives will serve as repositories of memory and experience 220 in those spaces (Trigger, Toussaint, & Mulcock, 2010; Strang 2010). During the 221 participant observation walks, photos were taken of management activities and 222 ecological features encountered. Notes were also recorded in a research journal to help 223 
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document the process, which was then expanded upon later in greater detail. The 224 participant led the walk and told stories about management activities, prompted by the 225 researcher when passing areas of visible management interventions. This included 226 discussions of how specific fencing or restoration works unfolded, how issues or 227 challenges were identified and dealt with, and what work still remained to be done. 228 These walks averaged around 90 minutes in length. 229   230 Table 1 provides an outline of the land use and conservation activities of the 231 participants involved in this research. Rather than provide comprehensive profiles of 232 participants, this table serves as a reference for later discussion about the conservation 233 actions of landholders and their experience of EcoTender. In broad terms, productive 234 farmers were landholders who derived the majority of their income from the land, 235 hobby farmers undertook small-scale agricultural activities for sale or self-sufficiency, 236 and lifestyle or conservation landholders did not use their land for agriculture. No 237 discernable differences emerged across these different cohorts in relation to the themes 238 discussed below. 239   240  241  242  243  244  245  246  247  248  249  250  251  252  253  254  255  256 
 257 
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Table 1. Outline of participant land use and conservation activities 258 
Participant Land use Conservation activities Participant 1 Hobby farming/conservation Landscape restoration through planting linear fence lines; weed control; fencing Participant 2 Hobby farming/conservation Restoration of large forest patch in gully; general weed control; fencing; covenant Participant 3 Lifestyle landholding with no livestock; bushland preservation Large scale pine tree removal, general weed control; restoration planting; covenant Participant 4 Conservation General weed control; pest animal trapping Participant 5 Hobby farm/small orchard/conservation Creek line restoration planting; general weed control; fencing Participant 6 Hobby farming/conservation Restoration planting around remnant patch; fencing; weed control; covenant Participant 7 Hobby farming/conservation Linear restoration planting; weed control Participant 8 Hobby farming/conservation Large scale weed removal from creek gully; restoration planting; general weed control Participant 9 Productive farming (sheep, cattle)/conservation Spot planting in remnant patch; general weed control Participant 10 Hobby farming/conservation Fencing; spot planting; general weed control Participant 11 Productive farming (cattle)/conservation Restoration planting; fencing; general weed control; covenant Participant 12 Productive farming (cattle)/ home business/conservation Fencing; large scale weed removal (blackberries); spot planting Participant 13 Small scale cattle grazing/home business/conservation Fencing; linear restoration plantings; general weed control; covenant Participant 14 Small scale cattle grazing/conservation Fencing; linear restoration planting; general weed control; spot planting; covenant Participant 15 Small scale cattle grazing/conservation Fencing; spot planting; general weed control; covenant Participant 16 Productive dairy farm/conservation Large scale restoration; weed control; fencing; spot planting Participant 17 Lifestyle landholding/conservation Large scale restoration planting; general weed removal Participant 18 Productive farming (mixed)/conservation Large scale restoration planting; weed control; fencing  259 
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There is always an expectation that research relying on voluntary responses to a call for 260 expressions of interest will only engage with the most willing, interested and compliant 261 EcoTender participants. However, the willingness of participants to talk frankly of their 262 experience, and the chance to walk participants’ properties with them, revealed a wide 263 range of landholder perspectives on EcoTender and private land conservation more 264 generally. While the total number of participants in this research is 18, this represents 265 nearly a quarter of the 81 participants from the West Gippsland EcoTender region. 266 
2.2 Landholder participant forum 267 The landholder participant forum was an opportunity for participants to gather 268 together with the researcher at the end of the research process to discuss findings and 269 talk with each other about their EcoTender experience. There were 24 participants in 270 the forum, including some local catchment/watershed management officers and DELWP 271 staff. The forum was held on October 14, 2016 at the offices of the West Gippsland 272 Catchment Management Authority in Traralgon, Gippsland. The forum was open to all 273 EcoTender participants from the West Gippsland trial, whether they were interviewed 274 for the research or not. The engagement with landholders and their interactions during 275 the forum were part of the research process, with particular emphasis on how the 276 discussions facilitated between participants reinforced the importance of social 277 networks for conservation. 278   279 The forum provided an opportunity for the researcher to present the six themes 280 discussed in the next section back to participants, allowing the forum to serve as a 281 triangulation method for checking whether the themes identified by the researcher 282 were those that participants themselves considered central to their experience. While 283 participants did not substantively challenge any of the themes, there were some 284 revisions made to the themes as a result of participant feedback. Most notably here was 285 the point that some landholders priced their labour comprehensively as they wanted to 286 be able to cover all management costs should they be successful in the auction process. 287 From this perspective, the forum proved invaluable for validating findings as well as for 288 facilitating landholder interaction. 289  290  291  292 
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3. Tenders in practice - the socio-ecological process of participation 293 In this section we cover four themes that reveal the ways that conservation tenders 294 operate in practice: under-bidding for permanent protection, uncosted labour in bids, 295 emergent novel ecosystems and the absence of social networks. We place a strong 296 emphasis on the creative and unanticipated co-option of payments, given their 297 prominence, and the implications this raises for using MBIs in PLC. However, we also 298 highlight the alignments that occur between landholder practice and the logic of 299 conservation tenders, to ensure a comprehensive and representative engagement with 300 the empirical material.  301  302 
3.1 Under-bidding to protect landscape legacies 303 As part of the tender bidding process, landholders were offered the opportunity to place 304 a legal covenant/easement over remnant vegetation or revegetation sites. Covenants 305 provide permanent protection for ecologies by placing legally binding constraints on 306 land use, such as the ability to subdivide or clear the property of vegetation. 307 Landholders were encouraged to adopt permanent protection by the allocation of a 308 higher assessment weighting to those bids, meaning landholders would have a greater 309 chance of their bid being successful. Seven of the landholders involved in this study had 310 secured a covenant on their land through EcoTender, but four of those landholders had 311 used this mechanism in an manner that departed from the scheme’s intention. Rather 312 than using the covenant as a means for enhancing the competitiveness of their bid and 313 increasing the likelihood of receiving money to cover conservation work, these four 314 landholders reduced the value of their bid as a way to increase the chance of getting a 315 covenant. Participant 6 explained the process of under-bidding to get a covenant:  316  317 “Oh, I just took a punt (on costing the bid), what I thought might get through, 318 what it would cost, and what I was prepared to accept as a fair deal... I paid half 319 of (the management costs).” 320  321 The covenant, rather than the money to cover management costs, became the ‘hook’ 322 that enticed some landholders to participate. Participant 6 and Participant 11 employed 323 the same strategy of estimating the land management costs associated with their bid 324 (for example, tree planting or weed removal) and then only requested half of that 325 money. 326 
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 327 The desire to protect these mixed remnant and revegetation sites revealed an important 328 consideration for programs offering permanent protection – landholders are seeking to 329 protect the legacy of their land management effort and labour as well as the 330 conservation values on their land (Cooke and Lane 2015). Participant 6 noted that the 331 covenant will “stop a developer coming in and knocking it all over” when they do 332 eventually sell (Figure 2). Or in the words of Participant 1, “I don’t want somebody to 333 come in in a future time and bugger it up again. That would be an incredible waste.” The 334 sense that landholders could secure their conservation work against future threats gave 335 them confidence that the ecological benefits they had helped to generate could be 336 retained if they sold the property. 337 
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 338 
Figure 2. A small strip of linear remnant vegetation that has been covenanted through EcoTender. 339 Protecting this against a future landholder who may seek to extend paddock space on either side was 340 consider vital by Participant 6.   341  342 Three of the four participants who pursued this underbidding strategy had sought 343 advice from a local conservation land trust (Trust for Nature), who had informed them 344 that the ecologies on their properties were not of sufficient value or size to qualify for 345 protection through that land trust. As such, EcoTender filled a gap in the permanent 346 protection options previously available to landholders from either government or land 347 trusts. Moreover, as Participant 11 noted, the cost associated with the covenant process 348 
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is substantial, so the opportunity to have your conservation legacy protected was an 349 attractive proposition: 350  351 “The covenants are the important thing. Because when I’m too old to do this and 352 we sell this, the [advertisement] in the paper… will say, ‘covenanted trees’” 353  354 While this process reduces government expenditure and satisfies landholders, under-355 bidding for a covenant raises questions about whether participants can meet the 356 financial costs associated with their contract if their bid does not cover the full costs of 357 the proposed works. For example, the bid from Participant 6 included fencing of 358 remnant vegetation. However, the costs that were included in the bid only covered half 359 the fencing costs. Should financial circumstances change, there is a risk that the 360 landholder portion of the investment may not be met. Moreover, when landholders use 361 their own funds to fulfil contract obligations, it may reduce the funds they have 362 available for conservation work once the five-year payment period of the contract 363 concludes. While the four participants noted here had few regrets about under-bidding 364 as the covenant was “the main thing we wanted” (Participant 6), it was clear that 365 participants’ would have liked more money for conservation work regardless of 366 whether they had permanent protection. 367  368 For the majority of participants who did not seek permanent protection, some were not 369 aware of its existence as a mechanism (two participants), others were unsure about its 370 implications but were open to future covenanting (four participants) and two 371 participants were firmly focused on funding fencing works and had not entertained any 372 other activities. Beyond this cohort, three participants spoke about deliberately not 373 pursuing a covenant. Participant’s 5 and 8 decided not to covenant due to concerns 374 about reducing the future value of their land, as their retirement savings had been 375 invested in the property. For Participant 8, this was to protect their retirement savings, 376 which were tied up in the property. Participant 7 did not want to impinge on a “future 377 owners’ right” to exploit the land in a way they might see fit, even if that meant the 378 conservation work they had done would be impacted. This shows that there can be clear 379 alignment between landholders with an absolutist perspective on private property 380 rights, and conservation programs that align with a neoliberal governance mentality 381 (Fletcher 2010).  382  383 
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3.2. Not costing personal labour in the EcoTender bid 384 The idea that some conservation work should exist outside the ‘service contract’ that 385 had been established through the tender process proved to be a unique insight into the 386 way environmental stewardship was perceived and practiced. Of the 18 research 387 participants with an EcoTender contract, only five of the participants included the cost 388 of their own labour as part of their bid. There was a strong sense that the labour of land 389 management was the altruistic contribution that participants could provide as part of 390 the conservation process. As Participant 16 noted, “(The labour is) my part, you’ve got 391 to put in yourself”. 392  393 For landholders who possess a strong conservation ethic already (a large proportion of 394 participants here, given their pre-existing conservation efforts already noted), the 395 money associated with EcoTender provides a unique opportunity to implement existing 396 plans. However, the desire to be an active steward and contribute altruistically to 397 conservation meant most landholders sought to volunteer their labour. As Participant 398 13 identified, “at the end we’re only custodians of the land”, and the goal of land 399 management must be to leave land in a better condition than in which it was inherited. 400 The desire to be an environmental steward and to leave a positive legacy is a well 401 established motivation for landholders involved in PLC (Lokocz, Ryan, and Sadler 2011; 402 Selinske et al. 2015): 403  404 Participant 17: “I put all the labour in (for rigging) the fences and planting the 405 trees, so it was really we were looking for the cost of the materials and the cost of 406 the trees” 407  408 First Author: Did you cost your labour? 409  410 Participant 17: No. No… just materials. Because when we bought the property, I 411 wanted to do this, before I even knew what an Ecotender was... we thought, 412 wouldn’t that be great revegetating, just as a project to do for ourselves sort of 413 thing.” 414  415 This reveals the way that conservation practice is bound up with other expressions and 416 experiences of land management, which might align more with intrinsic, recreational or 417 
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even aesthetic motivations for doing conservation work (Cooke and Lane 2015; Fischer 418 and Bliss 2009). The difference here is that this conservation work is being done under 419 contract, which changes the dynamic and the obligation for delivery. Participant 3 noted 420 this it will be nice to “just plug along at my own pace and not be subject to a timeframe” 421 now their contract is complete. 422  423 
3.2.1 Concern about bid competitiveness 424 The landholder forum conducted at the conclusion of the fieldwork emphasised the 425 uncertainty that many landholders had about how the process of pricing their bid. 426 Terms like “flying blind” and “guess work” were used on a number of occasions to 427 emphasise the level of uncertainty about what might constitute a competitive bid. 428 Moreover, landholders feared missing out on getting at least some funding for 429 conservation work they were already doing, even if it did not cover the total cost of the 430 works proposed in their bid. While this bodes well for the program in terms of showing 431 how the reverse-auction mechanism can increase cost effectiveness, it also reveals a 432 risk to the maintenance of conservation benefits in the longer term. As Participant 2 433 noted, the only question about whether their conservation efforts would continue 434 beyond their contract would be “how long are we going to be able to physically manage 435 this property?” For example, most participants did not cost the labour associated with 436 weed management, meaning there is a risk to achieving the intended management 437 objectives should landholders no longer be capable of doing the work. 438  439 As Participant 17 noted, it was very difficult “trying to keep up with things” when you 440 are volunteering your labour and the work was unfamiliar. Experiences like this saw a 441 number of landholders reflect on the fact that “it would be good to get some help with 442 (labour)” (Participant 2) if they were to apply for funding in the future. One participant 443 who did cost their labour did so at low rates to reduce costs, but also because they 444 considered themselves to be lay conservation practitioners: 445  446 Participants 3: [we costed labour at] about $40 per tree, because we’re just rank 447 amateurs, we’re not worth that much.” 448  449 There was however four landholders that sought to cost their bids accurately. For two 450 of these participants, including a “realistic” (Participant 4) costing was important, as 451 
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they did not have the financial capacity to undertake the work if the full costs were not 452 reflected in the bid. This was particularly important for two participants who were 453 relying heavily on contractors to do the work in their bids. While all of these realistic 454 bidders found it “very difficult to judge” (Participant 8) what their costs would be, they 455 did not want to be burdened with having to fund too much of their project themselves. 456  457 
3.3 Novel ecologies and landscape-scale ecological flows 458 The region in which EcoTender operates has a history of intensive landscape 459 modification for agriculture following colonial invasion in 1788. While Aboriginal 460 people prior to this time shaped the landscape, the large-scale clearing and rapid 461 intensification of grazing, cropping and dairy are the reason why ecological restoration 462 efforts are being pursued. However, changes to soil composition, introduced flora and 463 fauna, and climate change mean that traditional efforts to bring back benchmark pre-464 colonial ecologies have been roundly identified as challenging, if not undesirable, given 465 future climate scenarios and major environmental change (Mansfield et al. 2014). 466 EcoTender restoration was largely informed by a combination of historical benchmark 467 ecologies, with some flexibility for amendments on a case-by-case basis. Given that 468 restoration was a common component of landholder bids, landholders encountered the 469 difficulties historical benchmarks pose for restoration. Most importantly here, we see 470 the way that ecologies – with a focus on plants in particular – can be difficult to enrol as 471 willing participants in neoliberal conservation efforts.  472  473 Many participants dealt with the challenge of managing plantings that had not 474 materialised in the way they had intended. All but two research participants had a 475 restoration component to their conservation work, so the ecologies that were emerging 476 possessed a high degree of novelty. The types of novel outcomes included a failure of 477 seedlings to grow, the dieback of new plantings and established plants around them, 478 secondary infestation of weed species that had been cleared prior to planting, 479 environmental change factors like drought or flooding and the grazing of plantings by 480 native and introduced fauna. Another common experience was the spread of plants 481 from adjoining properties through seeds blow through on the wind or washed over 482 through flooding.  483  484 
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The ubiquity of eucalypt species in Victoria means there were few restoration efforts 485 that did not include eucalypts in the approved Ecological Vegetation Class (EVC) list of 486 plantings. Yet, there are many regions in Victoria where eucalypts are not considered to 487 be part of the pre-colonial ecology. This was the case for Participant 7, who did not have 488 eucalypts in their planting. However, there were sections of property with an adjoining 489 public land reserve that was a different EVC, which did include eucalypts. Subsequent to 490 the EcoTender planting, Participant 7 observed eucalypts from public land that adjoined 491 his property starting to sprout in this patch, going on to become the most dominant 492 species in the planting. The rate of growth and substantial number of recruiting species 493 led to a belief on the part of this landholder that eucalypts did indeed “belong” in this 494 highly modified landscape. Indeed, six other participants noted the growth of native 495 species in their planting that they did not plant themselves.  496  497 This experience reinforces that restoration sites are not blank canvases that exist in a 498 spatial and temporal vacuum – the history of land use and the ecologies on surrounding 499 lands will play a substantial role in how restoration unfolds. With the potential for 500 historical ecological benchmarks to become an even more difficult restoration target 501 into the future, there is a need to consider what we aim to achieve through PLC 502 restoration work, and the ways in which conservation programs might need to be de-503 coupled from private property as a scale of emphasis. While some participants took a 504 hands-off approach to managing unexpected plant growth in their restoration site, 505 noting that “it will work itself out” (Participant 5), others felt a level of anxiety that the 506 unexpected plant growth may mean they have breached their EcoTender contract. 507  508 The planting process also generates habitat interactions that participants do not 509 anticipate as being an issue at the outset. A notable example is the impacts that fauna 510 grazing and habitat creation have on the health and survivability of the species planted. 511 Often, the grazing species were native animals (such as wallabies or wombats), and 512 landholders developed a negative perception of these animals as they had undone all 513 their hard work to establish the planting. As participants 17 noted, “if it weren’t for the 514 bloody Wombats” grazing on her new plantings then she would not have had to spend 515 additional money from her own pocket to replace some of the species lost. When 516 surrounding ecologies are fragmented and resources are scarce, grazing fauna can 517 target new growth in restoration areas (depicted in Figure 3). 518 
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 520 
Figure 3. Participant 17 noted that resident Wombats in the forested segment of the adjacent property 521 (top of image) had come onto her property to eat the planted seedlings (centre-centre left of image). 522  523 When native plants spread across property boundaries, they can call attention to the 524 range, distribution and reproduction of that species in ways that reveal wider ecological 525 function. As in the example above, the presence and movement of species were 526 powerful catalysts for triggering awareness that the property scale was not always 527 suited to conservation efforts. Five participants asked why the planting list was 528 different to what plants they observed growing in the surrounding landscape, with 529 others also discussing their uncertainty about the accuracy of the revegetation lists that 530 had been provided for their area. 531  532 Moreover, while landholders were aware that ecological flows across the boundary 533 might mean ongoing weed presence on their property, the contractual obligation 534 through EcoTender to keep restoration free of weeds made them acutely aware that the 535 fortunes of their property cannot be separated from what goes on in the wider 536 landscape. As Participant 18 noted when looking across the district from a high point on 537 
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the property, “on a windy day you can see the seed heads blowing across the hill”. 538 Species movement across boundaries can challenge the logic of property-centricity in 539 the process of conducting conservation work, reinforcing the importance of working 540 collaboratively across boundaries. 541  542 
3.4. The desire for social networks and cooperation 543 The downside to a model that requires competition between bidding landholders to 544 drive down costs is that participants can go the duration of their contract without 545 encountering other participants. EcoTender has no direct mechanism for gathering 546 people together before, during or after bids are awarded. A key criticism of auction-style 547 programs, therefore, is that they can fail to build collaborative, cross-boundary 548 conservation efforts (Cooke & Moon 2015).  549  550 Eight landholders spoke directly and unprompted about the fact that they would like to 551 meet other participants and have an informal network where they could contact each 552 other. The central reason for wanting social connection was to gain some reassurance 553 that they were not the only ones who were encountering challenges, difficulties or 554 unexpected management outcomes from their activities (plants not growing, weeds 555 returning, for example). Participant 3 captured this feeling when describing the fact that 556 it would be nice to have a sense of “shared experience” in EcoTender. In terms of shared 557 experience, landholders spoke about being interested in knowing what other 558 landholders had been doing as part of their contract, and that specific advice or support 559 was not really necessary. For some landholders this point was related to the fact that 560 the EcoTender contract creates a sense of obligation that they had not felt with the 561 conservation work they had been doing previously.  562  563 The landholder participant forum was particularly incisive for reiterating the value of 564 knowledge sharing as part of conservation work. Both the formal and informal 565 discussions revealed the value of having a community of shared practice and experience 566 for specific conservation programs – a principle that has underpinned past conservation 567 programs (Tennent and Lockie 2012). Forum participants discussed different strategies 568 for protecting plants from grazing animals, different materials and construction 569 methods for nesting boxes and other funding sources that they might know about for 570 continuing their conservation work. Many of the issues discussed by landholders had 571 
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emerged through trial and error as they had attempted restoration or weed 572 management practices that had not gone to plan. Participants at the forum requested of 573 the EcoTender coordinators that the database of their contact details be shared amongst 574 the participants so they could contact one another should they have further questions 575 or wish to visit one another. 576  577 While it could be argued that EcoTender need not concern itself with enabling social 578 interaction and learning when learning can happen outside of the program, there are a 579 host of issues that arise through program participation and the specifics of EcoTender 580 operation that participants would like to be able to discuss with one another. The ability 581 to work through issues or uncertainties surrounding PLC programs (Moon, Marshall, 582 and Cocklin 2012) and tender programs in particular (Blackmore and Doole 2013) has 583 been previously reported by landholders. Moreover, not all participants enjoy 584 neighbours who are interested and informed about conservation practices, which can 585 leave some landholders isolated. 586  587 Despite the general view that a network would be beneficial, five landholders struggled 588 to think of any benefits that might come from interaction with other participants. One 589 landholder wondered, “what’s there to talk about?” (Participant 16) concerning 590 conservation work. Conservation programs cannot assume all participants will see 591 value in knowledge sharing, as some are happy working individually on their own 592 property. This appears especially true amongst exurban and rural-amenity landscapes, 593 where new in-migrants can be more inwardly focused on managing their own property 594 without wider interaction and engagement (Gill, Klepeis, and Chisholm 2010; Yung and 595 Belsky 2007). For participants like this, the property-centric, individual landholder 596 engagement model suited their approach to conservation. 597  598 
4. Policy implications and discussion 599 The ways in which people engage with EcoTender are dependent on their experiences 600 with the land management and ecological change over time. These experiences do not 601 always align with the logics of conservation tenders. Indeed, many of the narratives 602 explored above show the way people used EcoTender to leverage conservation efforts 603 that did not align with the intent of a program centred on financial incentives, or the 604 way ecologies are not easily entrained to the property-centric conservation efforts that 605 
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often accompany MBIs like EcoTender. Despite these limitations, there is a need to 606 acknowledge the role of EcoTender in generating ecological benefits as part of a 607 recognition that the neoliberalising of environmental governance can open up some 608 conservation opportunities amongst those that it forecloses (Sandbrook et al. 2013; 609 Fletcher et al. 2016). Moreover, where market instruments and neoliberal governance 610 structures are entrenched, there is an imperative to explore how they can be orientated 611 (or reorientated) to meet socio-ecological needs (Jackson and Palmer 2014; Holmes 612 2015). As such, this section discusses what can be done to open up MBIs like reverse 613 auctions to a wider trajectory of contingent management practices and ecologies where 614 they exist, whilst questioning the capacity of MBIs as a policy tool for responding to the 615 emergent challenges presented by PLC. 616  617 
4.1 Starting with the setting – socio-ecological context 618 The program adoption narratives of landholders have brought to light the need for the 619 prioritisation of local socio-ecological dynamics in the design and implementation of 620 market instruments (Selinske et al. 2016). The point that environmental policy must 621 consider local social context has been established in the private land conservation 622 literature (Cooke et al. 2012). What must now be explicitly acknowledged is the need to 623 challenge PLC policy that uncritically adopts MBIs due to their compatibility with 624 neoliberal governance logics (Peck and Theodore 2010) rather than their alignment to 625 the needs and circumstances of people and ecologies on the ground (Sorice and Donlan 626 2015; Trigger, Toussaint, and Mulcock 2010; Muradian et al. 2013). The way many 627 EcoTender participants struggled to conceptualise their stewardship labour as a service 628 to be costed and delivered to a contractual deadline, presented a unique insight into the 629 mismatch between policy logic and landholder practice; the real consequences of this 630 mismatch being uncertainty and anxiety on the part of landholders about their capacity 631 to fund and fulfil their conservation contracts. Thus, despite the hybrid governance 632 characteristics of EcoTender that enable some co-option of program intentions to meet 633 socio-ecological needs, a more flexible and responsive governance framework might 634 limit the extent to which co-option was necessary. 635  636 Local context also drove the desire on the part of some participants for using EcoTender 637 to gain a covenant, as a growing desire for perpetual preservation of their land 638 management legacy amidst dynamic land use change (Farmer, Chancellor, and Fischer 639 
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2011). The somewhat perverse outcome of achieving increased regulation through a 640 market mechanism further signals the need to question the assumptions that PLC 641 programs make about the drivers of conservation practice. In this case specifically, it 642 highlights that reverse auction tenders may not be the most cost effective means of 643 delivery when financial motivations for participation are not strong (Muradian et al. 644 2013). To ignore this context is to render invisible the socio-ecological dynamics of 645 conservation practice that are innately familiar to policy makers, researchers and 646 landholders alike. 647  648 MBIs for PLC must explicitly acknowledge that ecologies act and react to human 649 intervention through conservation practices in ways that are not uniform, easily 650 anticipated or isolated from surrounding socio-ecological processes (Head et al. 2015; 651 Ogden et al. 2013). When MBIs engage people through private property, there is a risk 652 that the mobility of plants and fauna (both wanted and unwanted) at scales above the 653 property parcel are not reflected. As this study demonstrated, wider ecosystem 654 interactions can draw people into landscape-scale management challenges that 655 EcoTender had no formal mechanism for addressing. In this way, ecologies themselves 656 showed how they can push back against neoliberal environmental governance that 657 positions private property as the foundation around which the policy is conceived 658 (Schwartz 2013; Büscher et al. 2012). However, MBIs for PLC have been geared towards 659 valuing cross-boundary collaborative efforts in the past (e.g. the Desert Uplands 660 Landscape Linkages Program), suggesting that attention to landscape-scale ecological 661 interactions may be feasible in some cases. Furthermore, payments schemes have been 662 rolled-out in contexts where individual property rights do not exist (McElwee et al. 663 2014). Constraining PLC policy to individual contracts at the scale of individual 664 properties risks closing down opportunities for collective and cohesive policy at a time 665 when landscape-scale responses are deemed increasingly necessary for conservation 666 (Fitzsimons et al. 2013).  667  668 
4.2 Working with novel ecosystems and environmental change 669 The experiences of landholders in this study raises questions about the rigidity of MBI 670 contracts if we are anticipating uncertainty in the way ecologies respond to the types of 671 interventions pursued through land management. This is especially true when we 672 consider the knock-on effects that are created by the initial management interventions 673 
  24 
undertaken by landholders (such as triggering new weed infestations) that will have 674 impacts well beyond discrete contracts. MBIs like reverse-auctions also require 675 landholders to commit to a program of works at the outset, given the need to formulate 676 a bid based on proposed works, restricting landholders’ capacity to respond to 677 unanticipated outcomes along the way. As finite interventions, programs like EcoTender 678 that often run for short periods (5-10 years) need to accommodate the history of 679 landscape modification and the contingent ways people and ecologies are responding to 680 change. The tensions between short-term contracts and ongoing stewardship suggest 681 payments must be part of a wider PLC response in which landholders have a stronger 682 role in policy design, rather than being the lynchpin around which those programs 683 operate (Muradian et al. 2013; Selinske et al. 2016). Given the redemptive aspirations of 684 restoration in many MBIs, landholders could play an important role in negotiating the 685 make up of species types that are used in restoration, allowing participants to draw on 686 their experiential learning, landscape observations and local histories, whilst still 687 ensuring that ecological function, diversity and abundance are enhanced by the 688 restoration process (Collard, Dempsey, and Sundberg 2014).  689  690 Thinking through the implications of novel ecosystems for MBI design may suggest a 691 role for collective bidding processes that enable landholders to work across property 692 boundaries and at larger ecological scales (Cooke and Moon 2015). Encountering 693 uncertainty and working through problems with others was a key part of the reason 694 landholders wanted ongoing social networks that were not facilitated by EcoTender. 695 This desire echoes the promoted benefits of Landcare in Australia, which centres on 696 social learning benefits, given the emphasis on collective, community-based responses 697 to land management challenges, rather than individual, property-centric responses 698 (Tennent and Lockie 2012). Trade-offs like collaboration versus competition that are 699 associated with MBIs must be better thought through, so the apparent cost efficiency 700 benefits of a blind, competitive funding model are weighed against the value of social 701 learning and collaboration (Sorice and Donlan 2015; Muradian et al. 2013). An enduring 702 network of participants can offer a point of contact and support for conservation efforts 703 once the connection with the environment department or direct extension officer is lost 704 (Selinske et al. 2016). 705  706  707 
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5. Conclusion 708 Conservation pursued through programs like EcoTender will not entrain all practices to 709 the logic of market instruments or private property ownership. As we have shown, 710 private land conservation policy inevitably forms part of a broader entanglement of 711 humans, ecologies, property, incentives, land use legacy and regulation that shape 712 dynamic conservation practices (Gill, Klepeis, and Chisholm 2010; Mansfield et al. 713 2014). Being attentive to the way neoliberal conservation connects to landscape and 714 land use histories, and environmental change factors, has been an oversight in private 715 land conservation research (Holmes 2015). From a policy perspective, MBIs used for 716 PLC must do more to create room for a diverse trajectory of conservation efforts in 717 dynamic socio-ecological contexts (Roth and Dressler 2012). This means conscious and 718 careful reflection on the validity of assumptions embedded in MBIs, an honest critique 719 of the trade-offs that come with applying market logic to conservation efforts, and a 720 discussion of the socio-ecological implications of these initiatives over the long term 721 (Lockie 2013). To ignore this imperative is to risk being “lulled into complacency” 722 (Muradian et al. 2013, p277) regarding the effectiveness of market instruments, as 723 conservation becomes further entrained by capital and private ownership (Fletcher et 724 al. 2016).  725  726 The ongoing experimentation with the use of reverse-auctions and tenders for 727 allocating conservation funding (Jindal et al. 2013) underlines the value of assessing 728 their structural and practical implications. EcoTender payments enabled positive 729 conservation outcomes for many landholders. Yet, the need for MBIs to pursue context-730 specific policy design and implementation was clearly evidenced by landholders’ 731 expressions of stewardship values and a collaborative ethics that clashed with a market 732 framing of their conservation work. Moreover, the flourishing of novel ecologies in ways 733 that challenged the logic of MBIs showed how policy must countenance abundance and 734 diversity goals that include local knowledge, especially in the context of highly modified 735 landscapes subject to substantial environmental change. Private land conservation 736 challenges will require more collective, contingent and adaptive policy that better 737 reflects the “diverse relations” (Fletcher and Büscher 2017, p230) between and 738 amongst people and ecologies – a task that may be incompatible with reverse-auction 739 MBIs in the long term. 740 
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